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SMUGGLING,  CAMOUFLAGING,  AND MARKET  STRUCTURE 
ABSTRACT 
We  examine  how  market structure and enforceaent  affect smuggling and 
welfare  in a model where smuggling  is camouflaged by legal  sales.  Conditions 
are given  for when some, but not necessarily  all, firms  smuggle.  With camou- 
flaging,  the market  price  is below  the price when all sales are legal,  so 
smuggling  improves welfare  i-f  the price  effect outweighs  excess  smuggling 
cost.  This  welfare  effect  is directly  related to the degree of  competition. 
Incressed  enforcement  in this model  potentially  reduces welfare.  The model 
is  shown  to be consistent  with evidence  on  cigarette  smuggling  in  the United 
States  for 1975-1982. 
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In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the analysis of smuggling  as 
an economic  phenomenon.' The seminal paper in this area is by Bhagwati and Hansen 
[1973), who  examined  the welfare  effects  of smuggling under perfect  competition  and 
monopoly  in a two good trade model.  They found that smuggling would necessarily reduce 
welfare only  when  smuggling  coexisted with legal trade.  This spawned a series of articles 
which, to  a large extent, dealt with when the  coexistence  of legal trade and  smuggling 
could be welfare increasing.  By introducing  a third non-traded  good, Sheikh [1974]  showed 
that  smuggling which  coexisted with legal trade could be welfare improving.  Pitt [1981] 
and Martin  and Panagariya [1984] obtained the same result by allowing legal  trade to 
coexist with smuggling  when firms camouflage their illegal trade by importing some goods 
legally. 
The  appeal  of these  recent  papers  is  that  they  focus  on  the  microeconomic 
foundations of the two types of trade coexisting.  Pitt's contribution  was to show that when 
competitive firms  smuggle  by  camouflaging,  the  condition for  zero  profits  in  long  run 
equilibrium implies  a price disparity2  (i.e.  a  domestic  price of  imports lower  than  the 
tariff inclusive world  price).  The  model  of  Martin  and  Panagariya  is  particularly 
important  because it  explicitly  introduces the  uncertain nature  of smuggling  into the 
individual firm's  decision  problem  and  shows  that the first order  conditions  for profit 
maximization require  a price disparity when the  probability  the firm will  be  detected 
smuggling is  a function of the amount it trades legally.  The Bhagwati-Hansen (BH) type 
of coexistence without price disparity is shown  to follow when the probability  of detection 
depends only  on the total amount smuggled. 
One  of the  shortcomings  of the Pitt  and Martin and Panagariya (hereafter P-MP 
models)  is that pure  legal traders are driven out of  the market when smuggling  occurs.  At 
the other  extreme, BH  type of smuggling allowe each firm  to either smuggle or  trade 
legally  (but  not both).  This  leaves unexplained the  intermediate case of camouflaged smuggling  by some,  but not all,  firms in a market.3  This case is more than a theoretical 
curiosity.  For example, commercial  smuggling of cigarettes from  low  tax  to high tax 
states  for sale in legal retail or vending  outlets has been  a problem  in the United States. 
In 1975 ten states reported this type of  smuggling  as their most serious  cigarette tax 
evasion problem [ACIR, 1977, p. 10], and the revenue loss to state and local governments 
in high tax states from cigarette tax evasion was estimated to be  $391 million  per year 
[ACIR, 1977, p.  1].  The Federal Contraband Cigarette Act of 1978 was enacted because 
the problem with commercial  smuggling was considered  so widespread. It seems unlikely, 
however,  that all  legal outlets were selling contraband cigarettes.  Another example of 
camouflaged  smuggling  is misweighing  or misinvoicing of  imports te avoid custems dutiea. 
There is no reason, a priori, to expect  all importers te do this. 
In this paper we model an import secter composed of firms in a Cournot industry in 
which legal traders can survive along with firms which smuggle through camouflaging  as 
long as firms differ in their excess  cost of smuggling and have  some market  power.  The 
model  is  quasicompetitive  in the sense that increasing the number of  firms increases 
imports and drives the domestic price in equilibrium  down to the level that would  prevail 
under pure  competition.  The  model  allows  the  coexistence  of camoufiagers  and  legal 
traders, but in the limiting case of  pure competition it can be shown te be equivalent te the 
P-MI'  type  models.  This  has  the advantage  of  allowing  us  te examine how market 
structure, as well as enforcement, affect smuggling and welfare.  The major results are: 
(1) that the price disparity that occurs  in models where smuggled trade is camouflaged is 
directly related to the degree of competition in the importing industry; (2) since this price 
disparity is welfare improving,  ceteris paribus, the welfare effect of  smuggling  in the model 
is directly related to the degree of competition as well; and, (3) since the quantity imported 
by a camouflager  exceeds that of a legal trader, ceteris pan bus, an increase in enforcement 
may reduce welfare even  when  enforcement is costless.  These results differ markedly 
from welfare comparisons  arising from coexistence with BH-type  smuggling. 3 
Sections II —  VI are theoretical. Because  the literature related to our work focuses 
on smuggling  across national boundaries, the discussion in these sections  will do so as well. 
The model,  however, also applies to smuggling  across  state lines  induced by differential tax 
rates,  and our empirical  analysis will focus on such a case.  In Section  VII we show that 
13.5. cigarette sales for 1975—82  are consistent with  our model of  camouflaged  smuggling. 
H.  Firm Behavior 
Consider  an  industry with  N  firms,  indexed  by  i,  who  behave  as Cournot rivals. 
Each firm imports and sells  domestically  a good for which it pays a fixed world price, p. 
We  assume that the  good is homogeneous  and domestic production is  zero,  so that each 
firm faces the inverse demand function P(Q), where Q denotes  the total quantity imported 
by  the  N  firms.  The  government  levies  an ad  valorem  tariff,  t,  and  provides an 
enforcement mechanism at level e in order to deter tariff.avoidance. Firm i can,  if it 
chooses,  attempt to smuggle a fraction  of 
q1,  the amount it imports. If it does, then the 
probability of successfully  smuggling a unit is s(A.,e), which we assume to be  decreasing 
and concave in both arguments and satisfy s(O,e)e[O,1J for all  and e and  s(O,e)  =  1 for 
all e. 
However,  there is an additional  cost to attempting to smuggle which is paid whether 
the firm is successful  or not.  This cost could be a real cost (from society's point of view) 
such as the cost of special packaging or a payment to foreign suppliers to misinvoice, or it 
could be a transfer such as  a bribe to a customs official to misweigh or to "look the other 
way."  In  general,  we would  expect this excess  cost to vary across firms.4  Those firms 
whose managers have more  experience  are more likely  to  have  established ties  with 
suppliers or officials and, hence, lower fees.  Similarly, they may have better information 
regarding the type of enforcement activity so that packaging effort,  and therefore cost, 
may differ.  The same arguments would hold for managers with familial  ties to suppliers 
and/or  officials.  To  allow  for such differences  among firms, we specify  a  firm  specific parameter,  y,  which with  e determines the  excess  cost of attempting to  smuggle.  For 
simplicity, we assume the total excess cost of  smuggling  is given by  Note that this 
specific functional  form of  total excess smuggling  cost is not necessary for our results.  The 
analysis carries through for any excess cost function which is linear in Sq.  and for one 
which is convex  in  as long  as the second order conditions are appropriately modified. 
We chose this form for expositional  convenience. 
Each firm is  assumed to  choose  and  so as to maximize its  expected profit. 
Expectations are assumed to be rational, so that 1— a(S,e) is the true fraction of  which 
is detected  and confiscated by the government  enforcement  mechanism. For simplicity,  we 
assume that  all goods  confiscated  are resold on the market5 and there are  no  fines,  so 
that expected profit  to firm i is 
(1)  EU(q,S)  = 
[s(9,e)P(Q)_p*_#ye]Sq  +  [P(Q)—  pt(l+t)](l—S.)q. 
where q = 
[q1  and S = 
[S  5N  Given standard Cournot-Nash  behavior, the first 




+  1_S][P(Q)+F(Q)q]+S(p*t_ye)_pt(1+t) = 0 
Equation (3) has the usual interpretation that a firm will expand imports up to the 
point where  expected  marginal revenue  equals marginal cost  (assuming the  vertical 
intercept of the demand function  exceeds p*(1 +t)).  Given that importation is optimal,  it 
follows from (2) and the aasumptions on s that a firm attempts to camouflage,  S>O, if and 
only if p*t>yle, which says that profit per unit successfully  smuggled  exceeds the per unit 
cost  of  smuggling.  Whenever  p*t>yle,  the optimal fraction smuggled  is determined 
uniquely  by  (2)  for  any  nonnegative vector  of imports  q  and  can  be  written as 
f.(q;p*,t,7.,e), whers  Of/8q1  = 
OfId > 0 for  all  ij  1  n,  Of/dp*  >  0,  Of/Ot > 0, 
C  0, and 8i18e < 0.  Notice  firm i's choice of S depends on the actions of its rivals 
only though market price, so that a given change in output by any firm (including  i) results .5 
in the same change  in  because it has the same effect on market price.  In particular, an 
increase in  imports by  any firm reduces price  and  induces  each firm to  increase the 
fraction it attempts to smuggle. This occurs because the marginal gain of  switching a legal 
unit of imports to an illegal unit. tp, is unaffected by F, but the confiscation  loss,  (1 
—  s)P, 
declines  with P. 
These results imply that when  smuggling is  optimal for  firm  i, its problem  can be 
viewed  as  choosing  a  level  of  imports to  maximize  (1)  subject  to  f.(q;P*.t,.y.,e). 
Expected profit can be written as 
(4)  U(q) = 
[s(f(q),eI)P(Q)_p*  e](q)q+  [P(Q)— p(l  —f1(q))q, 
in which case the necessary condition for an interior solution is 
(5)  [s(f(q),e)f(q)  + 1 —f(q)][P(Q)+P'(Q)q]  = f(q)(p* +y e) + (1 —f1(q))p(1+t). 
Given the  definition  of f(q) (5) is equivalent to (2) and (3).  We  also  assume that (4) is 
strictly concave in q for any  = 
(q1  q1_  1,...,q) so a unique  maximum exists. 
The second implication  of flf./8q.  >  0 is that  even  though the  world price and per  unit 
excess  smuggling cost are  fixed,  the  average cost of importing is  declining  in  This 
result is important in determining several comparative  static results in  Sections  Ill-VT. 
Moreover,  it prevents us from determining whether marginal cost is increasing in  or not, 
which explains why we explicitly  assumed  rI(q) was concave in 
Finally, we must impose  some restrictions on the inverse demand function  to insure 
the  existence and stability  of  an industry  equilibrium.  Assume that  there exist real 
numbers M and  K such that  P(0 = M  > 0 and P(Q)  =  0  for all  Q ￿  K >  0.  Also 
assume P(Q)  < 0 and P'(Q)+P'(Q)q < 0 for all q  [OK] and all i.  The latter condition 
insures that an increase in imports by any other firm  reduces  (shifts  down) the marginal 
revenue of firm i and hence the expected  marginal revenue of i as well.  This is sufficient 
to insure the stability of an equilibrium  and allows  us to do comparative statics.  It also 
insures that i's expected marginal revenue is decreasing  in its own imports.  Now we can 6 
view  the industry problem as a game in which  each  firm's strategy  set ie  [OK]  and its 
payoff function is given by (4)  if ptt > e and by (4) evaluated at  0 if p*t ￿  e. 
Industry equilibrium is  then a Nash equilibrium,  which is a vector  of imports (q1 
such that  ￿  II(q,q_) for all  [0,K]  and for all i  1  N.  Existence  of an 
equilibrium  follows immediately (see Theorem  7.1  in Friedman [1977]).  The equilibrium 
vector  of imports  simultaneously induces  equilibrium  fractions smuggled  by each firm 
6& where  = 0 if p*t ￿  v.e and i  = fiC)  (0,1) if p*t > 
HI.  Coexistence  of Legal Trade and Smuggling 
Now suppose  there are two types of firms, differentiated  only by the parameter 
Let N1 firms have  and N2 firms have 2  where  and 2 satisfy -y1e < pt C y2e for 
given values of e, pt and t. Then type 1 firms (with y1) will camouflage  and type 2 firms 
(with  will trade  legally  whenever it is optimal for both to import.  We  know that an 
equilibrium  exists in this case.  The interesting question is whether or not there exists an 
equilibrium  in  which  both  types import.  That is,  when  (if  ever)  is  the  equilibrium 
characterized by  (q1,q2)  where ii  =  >  0  for i1  N1  and  ci  = 
q2  >  0  for 
j=l  N2? 
Proposition  1:  There exist  locally  stable equilibrium outcomes  of  this smuggling 
game in whicb one group of firms uses legal trade to camouflage  its 
smuggling  and the remaining firms trade legally. 
Proof of Proposition 1:  Given 1e C ptt C 
'y2e,  it need  only be shown  that there 
exist  conditions  under which both types of firms import positive quantities.  Under the 
assumptions on expected profit,  a necessary and sufficient  condition for type 1  firms to 
import positive  is 
f(O)[s(f(O)e)M—pt  Tie] + (1 —f(O))[M—pt(1 +t)] > 0 
where 2 is an N-dimensional  zero vector.  Since f(q) is not a function  of M,  clearly  M can 
be chosen large enough  to satisfy this inequality for any feasible  and finite values of the 7 
parameters  of the  model.  Given that this  holds,  there  exists  a  q0  such  that each 
camouflager's first order  condition  holds  at  =  (O,K)  in the absence of any  legal 
traders (type 2 firms).  A sufficient  condition  to insure that some type  2  firms also import 
positive quantities is then P(N1q°)  > p*(1+t).  This last condition  holds for a large class 
of demand functions.  For example, if demand is linear, then  a sufficient  condition  for 
P(N1q°) > p*() is given by M > [N1p*(1+t)+p*t_y1e]/(N1+ 1).  Hence, the result of 
this  proposition  holds  for all linear demand functions  with vertical intercept M that is 
"large enough," and therefore also holds for an open, dense set of demand functions around 
each linear demand function  for which the result holds.  Given  existence, local  stability 
follows  from P'(Q)+P"(Q)q  C  0  (which insures the  composition  of the best  response 
function  of a camouflager with that of a legal trader  is  less than one  in  absolute  value). 
Q.E.D. 
The result in Proposition  1  is significant because it provides  a new and empirically 
plausible  explanation  for the coexistence  of legal trade and smuggling.  One group of firms 
pays the tariff on all units imported while another distinct group uses its  legal trade to 
camouflage its smuggling.  Two features of the model are necessary to obtain  this result. 
One,  as noted  above,  is  to  differentiate firms in such a wsy  that some may  find  it 
profitable  to smuggle  while others do not.  Here  we have taken  the  simple  approach  of 
assuming that  some  firms have a  lower  excess  smuggling cost than others.  The other 
feature  is  allowing  the firms  to  have  enough  market power that those  which  operate 
legally can survive.  As can be seen from the proof,  we accomplish  this by assuming that 
the number of camoufiagers  (N  is small  enough  relative to market demand.  Since the 
equilibrium  price if only  camouflaging  firms  imported  would  be  above  p  (1 +  t),  it  is 
possible for legal traders to operate  profitably as well. 
This  model  is  quasi-competitive in  the  sense  that  increasing the  number  of 
camouflagers andlor legal traders  increases total  imports  and  drives equilibrium  price 
down to the level that would prevail under pure  competition. Proposition  2: An increase in the number of  legal tradere, or camouflagers, or both, 
will increase equilibrium output and reduce equilibrium  price. 
Proof of  Proposition 2:  Let c  N1q1 +N2q2 be equilibrium  industry output and 
= f)  be  the fraction that each camoufiager  attempts  to smuggle in equilibrium. 
Because  camouflagers are identical  and  =  for all i  and J' it follows from (2) 
that there  is no loss of generality in rewriting this as  =  where f has the same 
properties as  Then F1(1,2) = 0 and F2(1,2) =  0 implicitly  define 1'2' and so 
and c ' whers 
(6)  F1(q1,q2) = 
[s(91,e)91+  lG1][P(Q)+P'(Q)q1] _91(p* +y1e)—(1—91)pt(1+t), 
(7)  F2(q,q2) =  +P'(Q)q2  _p*u  +t). 
Standard comparative statics and algebraic manipulation reveal that 
(8)  cI8Ni = (5i+ 1—1)1P'()2/F' 
(9)  c/5N2 = i+  1.—1)2P'()2IF 
where F  = 
(8F11c5q1)(OF2IOq2)—(8F11&q2)(8F2I8q1).  The  firms' second order sufficient 
conditions  and P'(Q)+P"(Q)q<0  imply F>0,  so that c''1 > 0 and  c1'3N2 > 0. 
Q.E.D. 
Suppose we begiii in an equilibrium where all firms earn economic profit, or  > 
pt(1 +t).  Then  it  follows  from  (7)  that  free  entry  of  legal  traders  will  drive  down 
equilibrium price until economic  profits  from legal trade  vanish, or  =  p 
* (1 +  t). 
However, camoufiagers  will still earn positive  profit.  It follows from (2),  (6), and (7) that 
s(i,e)P(c)_p*_yie 
= (l—_ i)P(c)_p*(1+t)  >  0, so, in fact, camouflagers break 
even  on each unit traded legally  and profit on each unit smuggled.  At the other extreme, 
(6)  implies  that  with  free entry  of camouflaging  firms  (i.e.  those with lowest excess 
smuggling  cost, 7)  equilibrium  price will fall until 9 
(10)  1[s(1,e)P()_p*  _.1e]+(1_1)[P()_p*(1+t)] =  0 
This requires s(i,e)P(Qc)_p*_ie >  0 > P(Q)_p*(1+t)  so that pure legal traders  (-y2 
firms) are driven out of the market.  is equilibrium  output when all firms are type  1 
firms earning zero economic  profit.  This limiting case  is the market structure studied by 
Pitt [1981] and Martin and Panagariya  [1984]. 
IV.  Price Disparity 
As one might expect, there is a price disparity implied by  this model,  and it varies 
both with the  composition  of the  market and the degree of competition.  The measure of 
price  disparity we analyze is the equilibrium  price when all N firms trade legally, P(), 
minus equilibrium  price  when  N1 firms camouflage  and  N2 trade  legally,  P().  The 
equilibrium  quantity imported by each firm when all N trade legally  is denoted by ,  so 
that  is  defined  by P+P'() =  p*(1+t)  where  = N.  Proposition  3 
summarizes the major results for this disparity (i.e. 1P = 
Proposition 3:  The  price disparity increases with (i)  an increase in the  fraction  of 
camouflagers in a given industry; (ii) an increase in the number of 
camouflagers if  demand is linear or if N1  = 
N2  and demand is 
concave  quadratic; and  (iii)  an equal  increase  in  the  number  of 
camouflagers and legal traders if N1  = 
N2  and demand  is either 
linear  or concave quadratic. 
Proof of Proposition 3:  (i)  Suppose  N1  is  increased and  N is  held constant, so that 
dN1+dN20. Then since  is unaffected, 
constant  = — P'() {(aC/3N1) 
—  c12  ] 
— (s1 + 1  @1)(1  q2)/F> 0 
since  > 
q2. 
(ii) After some manipulation 10 
= 
FP'(1)—  [(N+ 1)? k€  +NP"(  €1(s1 +  1 
[(N+ 1)P'(Q)  +NP'(1))F 
This can be shown to be positive for linear demand with  any market composition  and for 
concave, quadratic demand where N1  = N2 = N/2. 
(iii)  When N1N2N/2  the expression for 8P/ON simplifies to 
= 
2FP'C.)21—  [(N+ 1)? ()  +P"()](s1 +  1—6(q1 
2F[(N+  1)P'(1) +P"()] 
which is positive for linear and concave quadratic demand. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that assuming linear demand is  not sufficient  to 
show 5?sPI5N2> 0.  Q.E.D. 
The first statement in Proposition  3 holds because replacing a legal trader with  a 
camouflager  increases c' reducing  but does not change P() for given N.  On the 
other hand, suppose the number of camouflagers  increases, so that the number of firms in 
the industry  also increases.  Then from  Proposition  2,  both  and P() decline. 
Proposition  3 shows  that  declines more rapidly (at least for linear demand or for N1 
=  N2 and  concave  quadratic demand);  so  the price disparity  increases.  However,  an 
increase in the number of legal traders  has an ambiguous effect on  the price disparity. 
Nevertheless,  under the conditions stated, an equal increase in the number of  camoufiagers 
and legal traders will cause an increase in the price disparity.  Even if an increase in the 
number of legal  traders does reduce the  price  disparity, ceteris paribus, a corresponding 
increase in the number of camoufisgers  will more than  offset that effect and the price 
disparity will increase. 
The  intuition behind  results  (ii)  and  (iii)  is  straightforward.  With  entry,  the 
marginal revenue of a legal trader and the expected marginal revenue of a camoufiager 11 
shift down.  Both  types  of traders  reduce imports, but camouflagers are better  able  to 
protect themselves from entry because they can drive down average cost by smuggling a 
higher fraction (i.e. 881/ON  > 0). 
Figure 1 shows how the results in Proposition  3 relate to the P-MP measure of price 
disparity.  AP is given  by the vertical distance between  and  The horizontal 
axis measures N1, so that, depending on what is assumed  about N2  (and therefore N), the 
graph  can  represent  results  (i),  (ii),  or  (iii).  Recalling  Proposition  2,  notice  that  4A.P 
converges  to the  P.MP  price disparity  for large enough N  That  is,  P(4) declines to 
p*(1+t)  while  declines  to  so that A.P = a for N1rN1.  Hence the properties 
of .2P in Proposition  (3) are consistent with our observation that in  the  limit  our market 
structure is that of P-MP. Notice that when N1 ￿  C in Figure  1 the industry is composed 
entirely of camoufiagers;  yet 1P < a for N  C  N;.  That is, the number of firms is  still 
small enough for each identical firm to make positive economic profit. 
Now  consider  empirical  estimates of price  disparity.  Although  AF is a natural 
measure  of  price disparity,  empirically observed  prices  are  pt(l  +t)  and  the  market 
(domestic)  price,  P.  For NN;, PDp*(1+t)_P correctly estimates P()—  For 
N C N; p*(1+t)  does not represent P(4), so that the measure of price disparity used in 
previous literature  will  underestimate P.  However,  the relation  between  and 
> 
p  (1 + t)  can  be  used  to  assess  the  extent of  smuggling activity.  As  N < C, 
+ t).  For N  C  C,  only  low cost firms smuggle, while for N > C all firms in 
the industry smuggle. This means that, independent  of  market structure, a positive value 
of PD indicates that every firm is camouflaging. 
If PD is negative or zero, inferences must be based on a combination  of its value 
and other evidence on smuggling.  This is because the  observed  price may be either 
or  ).  A negative value of PD is consistent with either no smuggling (i.e. the market 
price is P(1)) or N C  C and low cost firms conduct a portion of their trade illegally (i.e. 
the market price is  As is clear from the Figure, an estimated zero price disparity 12 
either indicates N = C and firms camouflaging  or no camouflaging  and N = N;.  Only for 
positive estimates will it be clear that smuggling through camouflaging  is occurring,  and in 
this case all firms are smuggling. 
VI.  Competition and Welfare 
The existence  of a price disparity in the model leads to the possibility  that smuggling 
relative to  legal trade can be welfare improving.  As  in Pitt, when the excess  smuggling 
cost is merely a transfer to the government,  then smuggling  improves welfare via the price 
disparity.  The  results  of the  last  section  indicate that this  welfare improvement is 
maximized when there is free entry of camoufiagers.  If, on the other hand, there is a real 
excess smuggling cost, the welfare effect of smuggling  depends on the relative magnitudes 
of the excess  cost and lower price due to camouflaging.  Here again, the welfare effect of 
smuggling will  depend  on  the  degree  of  competition.  While  the  price disparity  is 
maximized  with free entry of camouflagers,  free entry will drive up total excess  smuggling 
cost because entry  leads to an increase in the equilibrium  quantity firms try to smuggle. 
The following proposition  characterizes the impact of a change in the number of firms on 
welfare. 
Proposition 4:  An increase  in  the  number  of  camouflagers  will  reduce  welfare 
whenever 'y1e91[1 + 
(N1Th1)(51J&N1)] ￿  but an increase 
in  the  number  of  legal  traders  will  increase  welfare  if 
71a1(N1191)Wf/8N1) ￿ P()p  where 
51/5N1 
= (Of1f8N1)(l/1)(8 
Proof  of  Proposition 4:  We assume demand comes from a utility function that can 
be approximated by U = U(Q)  +  m, where m is consumption of a competitively  produced 
composite commodity,  so  that welfare  is correctly measured by  the standard  surplus 
measures.  Hence, welfare is  consumer surplus  plus  expected  profits  plus  expected 
government  revenue  from  tariff collections  and  confiscations.  Expected profits  plus 13 
government revenue can be shown to be [P(c)_p*]c_7leK(e) where S = 
81N1q1  is 
total quantity firms attempt to smuggle and K(e) is the cost of enforcement.  Therefore 
(11)  W = fcp(Q)dQ _P*c —71e—K(e) 
Standard comparative  statics and algebraic  manipulation  yield 
=  —.e8{1 +  +  — 1e1]N1(1/ON1) 
where  >  +y1e  by  the  first  order  necessary  conditions  of  camoufiagers and 
C  0.  Hence  .,L.  <  0 if PTc)_p*_ieOi[1+(Ni!i)(8i5Np] ￿  0,  which 
proves the stated result for camoufiagers. 
Similarly,  one can show 
= 
[P) 
—pt —1e (N11/2)  —71e1N1(1/8N2) 
using the  fact that 881/0N2 = 
(8f/5N2)(8c/3N2)/2  Since (c1/ON2) C  0  C 
c/oN2) 
8W/ON2 > 0  if (N11I2)(8f/ON2)  ￿  (P()—p)/-y1e.  Observing  that  1(8f/8N2)  = 
this last inequality can be written as that in the statement of the proposition. 
Q.E.D. 
An increase in the number of camoufiagers  expands total imports at the margin, 
where total excess  cost increases through two effects.  One  is the additional excess  cost of 
the import increase, r1e61, and the other is the additional  cost from smuggling a higher 
fraction of imports.  (-y1e1N1/1)(81/8N1).  If the  sum  of these excoeds  the increase in 
consumer surplus at the  margin,  then  the subsequent loss  in  profits  and  government 
revenue is large enough for welfare to decline.  Because an increase in the number of legal 
traders affects  in a fashion  symmetric to that of an increase in camoufiagers,  we can 
state  the  condition for this  to increase welfare in terms of Sf/ON1.  With an increase in 
legal traders, consumer  surplus and government  revenue both increase, and the condition 
states a sufficient  condition for their increase to outweigh the reduction in profits. 14 
V.  Enforcement 
In a similar fashion,  the  welfare  effects  of increasing enforcement will depend  on 
whether  or  not it increases real  smuggling costs  and  on  the  elasticity of  the fraction 
smuggled  by a  camouflager.  An increase in enforcement will  reduce  both the fraction 
smuggled  by each  camouflager  and  total imports,  increasing price and reducing and 
consumer  surplus in equilibrium.  Then if y1 represents  a transfer to the government, an 
increase in enforcement  reduces welfare. If, however,  y1 represents  real resources devoted 
to camouflaging,  then an increase in enforcement can improve welfare since it reduces the 
total amount of imports smuggled,  and so the total excess  smuggling cost.  Proposition  6 
summarizes the results for this case. 
Proposition  5  summarizes  the  comparative  statics  results  needed  to  prove 
Proposition  6.  Comparative statics results for changes in t and p*  are also  given.  The 
proof is omitted because it is straightforward and not informative. 
Proposition 5:  An increase in either e  or  reduces q, ,  S, c' and P but 
increases  and P().  An increase in t increases  and reduces 
but the effect  on  all other equilibrium  values is  ambiguous.  All 
effects of a change  in p are ambiguous. 
Proposition 6:  An increase in the level of enforcement (excess  smuggling  cost of a 
camouflager)  reduces welfare if the equilibrium  fraction smuggled  by 
a camouflager  is  inelastic  with respect to the  level of enforcement 
(excess smuggling  cost). 
Proof  of  Proposition  6:  It  follows  from  (11)  that 
= p*] (+e) 
—K'(e).  Since  <  0 and the marginal cost 
of  enforcement, K(e),  must  be  nonnegative, a  sufficient  condition  for  aW/ae < 0  is 
￿  0,  or  —(eI)(I8e) ￿  1.  Similarly,  =  [P()_p*J(/&y1) 
— 15 
e ( 
—  is negative if  1.  Since  ￿  0  and  < 0, the 
statement  of  the  proposition follows  immediately under  the  convention  of  writing 
elasticities as positive numbers.  Q.E.D. 
An increase in  the level of enforcement  causes each camouflager  to reduce imports 
since  its  expected marginal revenue shifts down  and its marginal cost  shifts up.  This 
raises  price.and leads  legal  traders  to expand imports, but the net  effect is fewer total 
imports, less smuggling,  and a higher price.  Welfare is reduced  unless the resulting loss in 
consumer  surplus is offset by a reduction  in total excess smuggling cost.  If the fraction 
smuggled  is  inelastic  with respect to enforcement, the welfare increase from lower total 
excess smuggling cost. (due to the lower fraction  smuggled)  is not large enough  to offset the 
loss in consumer surplus.  An  increase in  shifts the camouflagers' marginal costs up, 
causing them to reduce imports with the same effects  on equilibrium  values, and therefore 
welfare, as a change in e. 
Finally, it is worth noting why we cannot obtain  welfare results for changes in the 
tariff and  world  price.  Recalling  Proposition  5,  an  increase  in  the  tariff causes 
camouflagers to increase imports and  legal traders to decrease imports.  Legal traders 
reduce imports because their marginal cost shifts up.  Camouflagers'  marginal cost shifts 
up also, but  to a lesser extent since they also increase the fraction they try to smuggle. 
Increasing the fraction smuggled  increases expected  marginal revenue enough to outweigh 
this  effect,  so each camouflager  expands imports.  The  net effect  on  equilibrium total 
imports, smuggling,  and the price are uncertain.  Although  the effects  of an increase in the 
world price are very similar to those of an increase in the tariff, we cannot determine how 
any  equilibrium  values change when p  changes.  The  difference  is  that an increase in t 
increases camouflagers' marginal cost only  through their legal imports, while an increase 
in p' increases marginal cost through legal and illegal imports. 16 
VII.  Empirical  Analysis 
In  this  section  we consider  the empirical  relevance  of this type of smuggling. 
Pitt's original  model was developed  to explain  the observed  price  disparity for Indonesian 
exports  of  rubber.  Branson and  Macedo  [1987]  examine  the  black  market  premium 
related to Pitt-type smuggling  in the Sudan.  Norton  [1988]  developed  a model  similar to 
Pitt's to explain  pig smuggling  between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  All 
of these studies assume  perfect competition. In this section  we consider situations where 
this assumption may not be warranted. 
An obvious example is where governments restrict entry through import licenses. 
Smuggling  is generally regarded as prevalent in Indonesia,  and recent data for Indonesia 
show that of 5229 traded commodity  classifications,  1484 were under license and only 296 
of  these  were  subject  to  quotas  (Pangestu,  [1987]).  1360  of  these  items  were 
manufactures such as steel, textiles, machinery,  pharmaceuticals, and plastics. A natural 
question to ask is whether licensing is merely a  technicality,  or whether there are indeed 
few firms in the  market.  In  the  case of polyester  and rayon  fibers,  the  government 
recently liberalized the licensing procedure so that six state trading companies  are allowed 
to import fibers  rather than  the  previous  sole  importer (Pangestu, p.32).  The  right to 
import plastics is restricted to three firms (Pangestu, p. 34). 
Interstate  cigarette smuggling in  the  U.  S. is another  likely candidate for our 
model.  Different cigarette taxes across  states provide the incentive for this smuggling,  and 
it has  been  considered  a major problem by state  and local  governments since  the early 
1970s.  There is  also  evidence  that cigarette industry structure  is  neither collusive  nor 
perfectly  competitive  (Manchester [1973],  Sumner  [1981],  Appelbaum  [1982],  and 
Sullivan [1985]).  Recalling  that our  model  allows  for a variety  of market  outcomes 
(both in terms  of competition  and  degree of illegal  activity), it is  a natural  choice  for 
examining  domestic  trade of  cigarettes. 17 
In Sections  A  and  B  we  Locus  on the cigarette example.  The primary  reason  is 
that  price  data  needed  to examine the  extent  of  smuggling  are readily available for 
cigarettes.  We  present evidence  that camouflaged  smuggling is  widespread  enough  to be 
statistically significant  in a regression framework.  Moreover,  empirical estimates of price 
disparity are consistent  with the view that some, but not all, firms in the market smuggle. 
A.  Industry Smuggling Characteristics 
Cigarette smuggling  practices  include consumers crossing state lines  for personal 
consumption  purchases, as well as smuggling of cigarettes by wholesalers and retailers for 
resale in retail or vending outlets. While we account for casual smuggling in our empirical 
estimates, our interest is primarily in the latter.  The exact mechanism for commercial 
(organized)  smuggling  varies, but it generally involves  distributors or retailers in high tax 
states purchasing cigarettes from a wholesaler in a low tax state.  The state tax in the low 
tax state is paid, but the wholesaler  is paid a premium not to affix  any tax indicia to the 
cigarettes.  The  distributor or  retailer in the  high tax state then uses a counterfeit tax 
stamp to evade the higher tax.  Enforcement  evidence suggests the bulk  of these purchases 
are made in North Carolina  and some in Kentucky  [ACIR, 1977 and 1985]. 
There are  a number of empirical  studies of cigarette smuggling.  The Advisory 
Committee  on Intergovernmental  Relations  [ACIR 1977,  1985] estimated the revenue loss 
to  high  tax states  from  all forms of cigarette smuggling to  be  $390 million  in  1975.  A 
demand equation for cigarettes was  estimated using data from non-smuggling  states and 
used to predict cigarette consumption  in smuggling states.  Comparing  the estimates with 
legal  sales  (that is, tax  paid cigarette sales)  gave a measure of the extent of smuggling. 
Since the ACIR's interest was in revenue loss regardless of the form of smuggling,  it did 
not attempt  to  differentiate between  casual  and  commercial  smuggling.  Other  studies 
finding significant  smuggling  effects are Manchester [1973], Baltagi and Levin [1986], and 
Baltagi and Goel [1987].  These  studies, like the ACIR  study, do not provide  evidence  on 
the extent of casual versus commercial  smuggling. 18 
Like  the  ACIR,  we  examine how the  presence of  smugghng affects demand 
estimation.8  But we  differ  by  using  data from smuggling as  well  as  non-smuggling 
states,  and we account for  smuggling with regressors  expected  to  he  sensitive to  the 
different forms of smuggling.  To  differentiate between the  two  forms of smuggling,  we 
rely on the fact that casual smuggling  is predominantly consumers crossing  into adjoining 
low tax states  to purchase cigarettes from  retail outlets while  commercial  smuggling is 
predominantly trucking of large quantities of  cigarettes purchased from  wholesalers in 
North Carolina  and, to a lesser extent, Kentucky. 
Before  turning to our estimation strategy,  several  additional facts  need  to  be 
mentioned.  First,  consumers  who  purchase  commercially  smuggled  cigarettes  are 
unaware, in general, that they are purchasing contraband goods.  Second, the measure of 
cigarette sales available on a state by state basis is the quantity of cigarettes for which the 
iocai state taxes have been paid.  That is, actual quantity demanded in the ith state at 
time t. Q, is the sum of  observable  legal or tax-paid cigarette sales, Lt and commercially 
smuggled  cigarettes,  'itS  Cigarettes smuggled  by  consumers  from adjoining  states are 
substitutes for locally available  cigarettes, Q. 
Consider a standard demand equation for cigarettes 
=  + 431RP.t  + $2I'C1 + 
,@3t  +  $4AVRP.t  + '35•t  1 + 
where i refers to the state, t refers to the time  period, Q is tax paid cigarette sales, RP is 
retail price,  INC is income,  and AVRP is  the  average retail price in neighboring  states. 
We include a time trend to control for declining  cigarette sales in response to advertised 
health hazards of smoking.  AVRP  is the average price of cigarettes in neighboring  states 
and accounts for casual smuggling.  In  the presence of commercial  smuggling,  we can 
substitute  L + 'it into the above and rearrange  to form 
(12)  L.t 




—  'it +  6iV  In the absence of  commercial  smuggling, u = 
Elt ie a 
zero mean disturbance uncorrelated with the regressors. But with commercial  smuggling, 
the disturbance  is no longer a zero mean disturbance and can be expected to be related 
to smuggling activity.  That is,  an  appropriately specified equation for Lt would either 
include I.  and I.  or determinants of those variables.  it  it—i 
To determine whether commercial  smuggling exists we need to determine whether 
u  is  a  classical disturbance uncorrelated with  determinants of I.  or  a  non-classical  it  it 
disturbance correlated with determinants of  'it'  We  proceed  by  regressing Lt on  the 
demand variables plus  the  difference  in tax rates between  state i  and North Carolina 
(TAXDIF.).  In the absence of smuggling  the estimated coefficient of TAXDIF  should not 
be significantly  different from zero; in the presence of smuggling  the estimated coefficient 
should be significantly  different from zero.  It should  be noted that the sign of TAXDIF is 
indeterminant because of other excluded  variables when smuggling occurs  (enforcement, 
etc.)  and  because of  interaction of  TAXDIF,  the  excluded  variables,  and  the  demand 
variables. 
Instrumental variables estimation is used because of possible simultaneity due to 
the presence of RP  as  a regressor in (12).  As instrument for RP we use the  predicted 
value of RP in a regression of RP on the regressors in (12) as well as TAXDIF,  a dummy 
variable te reflect the enactment of the  Federal  Cigarette Contraband Act  of 1978,  the 
state cigarette tax rate, the wholesale price plus the federal excise tax, and an index of  the 
wage rate of  grocery store workers.  Data are annual for the period 1975—82  for 29 states. 
We exclude  North  Carolina  and  Kentucky  because they are a source  for  commercially 
smuggled  cigarettes, as well as states with local cigarette taxes, states with more than 5 
percent of sales on Indian reservations, and states with at least 5 percent military.  The 
latter two sets  of states are  excluded  because  cigarette sales on military  and  Indian 
reservations  are  exempt from state taxes,  hence a  potential for intrastate  smuggling 
exists.  Finally, we exclude Utah because of the high proportion of Mormons  in that state. 20 
A total of 232 observations are used.  Tax paid sales and income are per capita.  We use 
both a linear and a log.log version  of the model with the results given in Table  1. 
Retail  price,  lagged  (legal)  sales,  and  trend  have  expected signs  and  are 
significant.  We  find  income  insignificant,  as  do  Ealtagi  and  Levin.  While  there  is 
anecdotal evidence  that casual smuggling  occurs  and some authors  have found it to be 
statistically important (though  of small effect —  see  Baltagi  and Levin and Manchester), 
we find it to be statistically unimportant.  On the other hand, the statistical significance of 
TAXDIF  indicates  that commercial  smuggling  is pervasive.  Only if 'it is substantial would 
TAXDJF be expected te be significant in an equation describing  consumer  behavior. 
E.  Empirical Price Disparity 
For some of the states in the sample,  cigarettes are primarily smuggled  in, while 
for others there is no smuggling  or cigarettes are smuggled  out.  In this section,  we focus 
on  price disparity  in states where cigarettes are  primarily smuggled  into  the  state. 
Combined  with our results on the importance  of commercial  smuggling,  the observed  price 
disparity can be used to indicate whether all firms are smuggling. 
In Section IV we discussed the information  contained  in the sign of  observed price 
disparity, PD = p*(l+t) 
—  P.  To give empirical  content to the measure in the cigarette 
case, several adjustments are made in calculating  PD.  Since the cigarette tax is per unit 
rather than ad valorem, the first term in PD is replaced by p"  + t.5  For the cigarette 
case, pt is the wholesale  price plus distribution  costs and federal excise tax. 
Our measure of  the cigarette price disparity for the ith in-smuggling  state at time 
t is 
(13)  PD.  =WP  +FT+ST.  +11  —RP.  it  t  it  it  it 
where 21 
WP is the wholesale price at time t (equal for all states) 
FT is the federal  excise tax (equal to $08 for all observations) 
ST is the state tax 
D is a measure of distribution cost, and 
RP is retail price. 
Because  direct data are unavailable, we construct a measure of distribution cost 
based on observed markup in states with no in-smuggling.  Observed  markup for the jth 
non-smuggling  state is (RPJ 
— 
WP 
—  FT  — 
STJ) 
so  that  it includes  factor costs and 
profits.  As  is  appropriate for a state  with  no  smuggling,  this measure  implies  a  zero 
observed  price  disparity in the jth State at time t.  Barring differences in factor costs or 
market structure across  states, this markup would proxy distribution costs in the absence 
of smuggling.  However,  factor costs do  differ  across states,  and  to account for this we 
weight the markup by  an  index of relative wage rates.  Since  the primary factor cost in 
cigarette retailing is labor,1° we use wage rates of grocery store workers. In (13), then, 
D.  =  (RP.  — WP 
—  FT — ST. )/WI..  it  jt  t  jt  ijt 
where WI is the ratio of  wage rates in j to those in i. 
Ideally  we  would  calculate  markup  using  states not  engaged  in  any form of 
smuggling (in or out), but we cannot be  certain which (if  any) states fall in that catagory. 
We initially choose North Carolina  and  Kentucky as  the "base" states  since it is  known 
that only out-smuggling  occurs  there.  A second base group is composed of states for which 
we have strong priors that  no commercial  smuggling occurs.  States  in this group have 
state taxes within 10 cents per pack of the North Carolina  tax (taxes are averages over 
the period and stated in 1982 prices).  In all exercises we exclude from consideration  states 
with large American Indian and military populations  as well as Utah and states with local 
11  taxes. 
In a 1975 survey [ACIR,  1977],  Six of the  states in our sample indicated  that 
smuggling by  stamp  counterfeiting was  a  serious  problem.  We calculated the  price 
disparity in those states for each of  the  8 years in our sample.  Using  the North Carolina 
and Kentucky markup, the price disparity is positive in only  7  of the 48 cases.  Using 22 
average markup in our "perceived  no-smuggling"  states, the price disparity is positive in 
only  16 cases. 
We also examine price disparity for states whose average tax rates were at least 20 
cents  per  pack  above  the  NC.  tax  (seven  states).  This  selection  criterion  does  not 
discriminate between  commercial  and casual smuggling,  but it does capture states with the 
greatest incentive  to smuggle  (either  commercially  or casually). Using the North Carolina- 
Kentucky markup base, the price disparity is  positive  in one-third  of the cases.  For the 
second markup base, the price disparity is positive in 48 percent of  the cases. 
To  summarize, we observe  a negative price disparity in the majority of  cases 
examined.  In  the context of previous  models  of  camouflaging,  this  result would  be 
inconsistent  with  the  presence  of  smuggling.  But  we  know  from  enforcement and 
statistical  evidence  that commercial  smuggling is a prevalent phenomenon.  Our model 
allows the interpretation that some, but not all, firms in the industry smuggle. 
VIII.  Concluding  Remarks 
BH is the only study prior to this one to examine the welfare effects of smuggling 
with varying degrees of competition.  This paper provides  an analysis of smuggling and 
market power when smuggling  occurs  through camouflaging.  The advantage of the model 
is that it includes both the realistic type of smuggling  modelled by P-MP and BH's equally 
realistic notion  of different firms conducting  the two types of  trade (i.e. smuggling and 
legal trade).  We have shown  that the coexistence  of two types of firms is precluded if and 
only if there is free entry of firms capable of  camouflaging.  In particular, if the smuggling 
technology  and enforcement  effort make camouflaging  profitable  for only a small number 
of firms,  then even in the long run we could observe  some firms trading legally  and others 
camouflaging. 
Unlike  BH, however,  coexistence  in  this  model can be welfare  improving.  Here, as 
in P-MP. this  is  due  to  the  price  disparity  implied  by  the  first  order  conditions  for 
camouflagers.  As  one  might expect,  this disparity and therefore the welfare effects  of 23 
smuggling are  related  to the  degree  of  competition  in  the  market.  In BH's  case  of 
coexistence  (where  smugglers do  not camouflage),  monopoly  was  preferred to  perfect 
competition  (since with  no price disparity "the fewer smugglers,  the better" p. 184).  Here 
we obtain the  more  conventional  result that welfare is  higher the  more firms there are 
whenever  there is no real excess  smuggling  cost.  When  there is a real excess  cost to 
smuggling,  the  welfare  effects  depend  on the  extent to  which  increased  competition 
increases excess  smuggling costs. 
Finally, we show that observed  price  disparity with  camouflaging  can be positive 
or negative.  In  previous  models,  camouflaged  smuggling produced  a  positive  disparity. 
This  followed  because the  analysis  was  restricted  to  perfect  competition.  In  a  more 
general setting, camouflaging  can occur  with negative observed disparity when not all 
firms smuggle.  Our empirical  evidence on commercial  cigarette smuggling in the U.S.  is 
consistent with this being the case. 
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from Tobacco Situation and Outlook Yearbook, Economic Research Service, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (March 1975 and December 1986).  Data are 
available from the authors upon request. 26 
Footnotes 
tThe text  cites work directly related to ours.  Studies  of somewhat related  illegal 
activities  are Ethier's [1986] analysis of illegal  immigration and Grossman and Shapiro's 
[1988] study of  counterfeit product trade.  The analysis of  smuggling  has also been related 
to currency convertibility issues  by  Macedo  [1987].  For  an interesting discussion and 
analysis of smuggling in West Africa, see Stolper and Deardorff [1988].  For a survey of 
tax evasion issues, see Skinner and Slemrod [1985]. 
2The price disparity in Pitt's  certainty model  can be  derived  from the firm's first 
order conditions  csee his equation (2a)) as well as the zero profit condition. 
3Norton  [1988]  develops  a model  for smuggling of agricultural goods.  Firms in his 
model  decide  the allocation of a given quantity between domestic  and foreign illegal  and 
legal  sales.  Their  desire to  smuggle is  based  on  their  distance from  the  border.  In 
principle,  this could lead to a variety  of market outcomes, but he does not examthe the 
market equilibrium. 
4Assuming  different excess costs is  the easiest way to introduce  heterogeneity into 
this model.  The desired result  could be obtained as well by assuming different probabilities 
of success functions for the firms, but the analysis is much more cumbersome in this case. 
tWe abstract  from issues  related to  why  the tariff is  imposed.  If the tariff were 
imposed  to restrict consumption or  to encourage production, resale  of confiscated goods 
would not be an ideal assumption.  If, however, revenue maximization is the government's 
goal, the resale assumption is not a problem. 
6Because  we are interested in camouflaging (such as underinvoicing),  we do  not 
consider the possibility that  = 1.  Formally this can be ruled out by assuming s(1,e)  = 0 
for e > 0. 
7Available data do not allow  tests of market power at separate stages of cigarette 
marketing.  Both the cited studies and ours treat the market as the  combined  system  of 
manufacturers,  wholesalers,  and retailers.  Nonetheless, the  studies  of  market power 27 
presume that the major scope  for exercise of monopoly  power is at the manufacturing 
level.  Although  their  methods differ,  these  studies tend  to  reject  both  the  cartel and 
perfect competition  hypotheses.  This is the case most appropriate for our model  since we 
specify  an arbitrary number of non-colluding  firms. 
Since data  are  for  all  cigarettes,  both  these studies  and  ours  abstract  from 
product differentiation.  Explicitly introducing product differentiation to our  theoretical 
model  should produce  similar results as long  as the firms' choice variables are quantities. 
Alternatively, one could interpret  the model in terms of  smuggling a particular brand. 
8For  specific functional forms of demand,  one could use  (6)  and  (7) to  solve  for 
and q2.  With data on  N1  and N2, one  could directly estimate the legal sales equation 
implied by our model. 
9For fixed p, results in Sections II  —  VI are  the  same qualitatively with either a 
per unit or ad valorem tax. 
10lnitially  we thought transportation  cost would  be an important cost and thus affect 
smuggling incentives.  Apparently,  it  is  a  minor  cost.  Input-output  data  for  1977 
[Department of Commerce,  1984] show that transportation cost accounted for .5 percent of 
the value of tobacco products. More recently, an undisclosed  cigarette company official told 
us that in 1984 average transportation cost amounted to .6 cents per pack of  cigarettes. 
t1States with military bases  and Indian reservations are subject to another type of 
smuggling which  would  bias the legal sales data.  Utah is excluded because of the large 
Mormon population.  The state tax rate would not reflect the effective tax for states with 
local taxes.  An effective tax rate could be calculated  using data on local sales and local tax 
rates.  Smuggling  incentives are affected by these local tax rates, so that the local and rest 
of state sales reflect the extent of smuggling.  Hence the effective  tax rate so calculated is 
endogenous. 28 
Table 1.  Cigarette Demand Equation Results 
Variable  Linear Model  Log-Log  Model 
Constant  22.66  (337)**  .24  (357)** 
Retail Price  —26.76 (  1.90)K  —1.14 (  1.92) 
Income  —1.14  (—.56)  —1.01  (—.72) 
Average Price Neighboring States  7.96  (.93)  .03  (.70) 
Trend  —.61  (_4•33)**  —.005  (_4.91)** 
Lagged Sales  .96  (7549)X*  .97  (75•94)fl 
Tax Difference with NC  17.94  (1.67)*  .02  (1.97)** 
R2  .98  .98 
t-ratios given in parentheses 
*  Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level d
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